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The Perceived Threat of Affirmative Action Policy

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Final report 6 June 1975



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A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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
This study was an attempt to measure the degree of perceived affirmative action threat held by white Command and General Staff College officer students. Simply stated, affirmative actions are positive steps or measures which go a step beyond "de jure" equal opportunity, and attempt to make allowances for social and economic deprivations experienced by some soldiers.

Based on the findings of this study, it was recommended that better race relations/equal opportunity education be intensified within the Army. Further, special emphasis should be given to insuring a better understanding of the Army's affirmative action policies.

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ABSTRACT

This study was an attempt to measure the degree of perceived affirmative action threat held by white Command and General Staff College officer students. Simply stated, affirmative actions are positive steps or measures which go a step beyond "de jure" equal opportunity, and attempt to make allowances for social and economic deprivations experienced by some soldiers.

The researcher hypothesized that a significant threat feeling was perceived by these officers. An implicit assumption was made that affirmative action threat was a phenomenon which was separate and distinct from general racial feelings.

The hypothesis was not rejected, as measured by the research instrument. In fact, a very high degree of affirmative action threat feelings were expressed by the respondents. However, affirmative action threat was found to be differentially related to general racial feelings at the .001 confidence level. Thus affirmative action threat feelings were not independent from general racial feelings.

Based on the findings of this study, it was recommended that better race relations/equal opportunity education be intensified within the Army. Further, special emphasis should be given to insuring a better understanding of the Army's affirmative action policies.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

President Truman officially abolished discrimination in the military in 1948 by executive order. Since that time the Army has made truly impressive progress toward the goal of equal opportunity for all. Some authorities believe the Army to have made more progress than any other institution in the country toward equal treatment of minorities in general, and Negroes in particular.¹

Twenty-six years is a relatively short time when compared to the more than 300 years that whites and Blacks have lived together in America. Since President Truman issued his momentous directive in 1948 the winds of change have blown strongly across the Army and the nation.

From 1948 to 1963 slow but steady progress was made in the removal of statutory barriers to equality. In 1963 Secretary of Defense McNamara issued orders to withhold federal recognition from any National Guard unit which continued to exclude Negroes from equal participation. Since the National Guard units in 10 southern states were the last vestige of overt segregation left in the military, this order had the effect of culminating the long effort to eliminate segregation.

In the mid-sixties, during the riots which swept urban areas across the United States, a new solution was put forth. The U.S. Riot Commission recommended sweeping positive actions to help Black Americans. This commission proposed that the mere removal of statutory obstacles and barriers, the elimination of overt discrimination, was not enough. They pointed to the fact that most of these barriers had already been eliminated and still de-facto equality was a distant goal. The commission based its recommendations on the theory that the average Negro was so far behind the white majority that he (or she) would have to be helped out of the abyss by positive, forceful action.

Favorable response came quickly to this recommendation. Soon institutions of all kinds had established goals for a desired level of minority participation. However, all did not view this trend favorably. Some felt that terms such as goals, positive action, or affirmative action were in reality merely euphemisms.

A feeling of resentment began to develop among the white majority. Perceiving affirmative action as special treatment for Blacks, the white middle-class began to feel threatened.²

The measurement of affirmative action threat feelings in such a large and poorly defined a population as the white middle-class is beyond the scope of this study. A smaller group, and one of more immediate and professional interest, is professional white Army officers. Although

white Army officers come from all classes of American society, a very large proportion is drawn from the middle-class. Could not, then, threat feelings arising from this issue be present in the Army Officer Corps? This reasoning led to formulation of the basic problem statement.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The intent of this investigation was to determine the percentage of white officer students in the 1974-75 Command and General Staff College Regular Course who felt threatened by the "affirmative action" policies of the Army.

Interest in the investigation of this problem was aroused early in the 1974-75 course by hearing reactionary comments from other students in the class. Here are some examples of comments heard.

A West Point major, promoted to that rank ahead of his contemporaries was heard saying:

. . . If I could just keep my same intelligence, abilities, social grace, etc., . . . and somehow turn black, I would be a two star general in less than ten years. As it is, with the competition, I'll be lucky to make colonel.³

Another officer, frustrated because his younger brother had been denied entry to the medical school of his choice said:

My kid brother had damn near straight A's. He did well on his aptitude test, but, he didn't get in because there were 100 other guys better qualified. What really burns me up is that the school saves about 15-20 slots for black kids above the 100 competitive admissions. All the black kids have to do is meet the minimum requirements and hell, they'll get 'em a tutor or anything to get 'em through. And you know what?

The God-damned Army is getting to be the same way!⁴

Another officer, of Oriental ancestry, was asked if he thought the Army practiced reverse discrimination. He said only half jokingly:

They do and I think it is philosophically and morally wrong. And, I hope they stop it as soon as I make general officer because of my slanted eyes!⁵

These comments, and others, plus a general negative reaction by many white officers in the class whenever race relations were discussed initially caused the writer to hypothesize that the middle managers of the Army might feel threatened by the Army's affirmative action policies.

Once developed, this hypothesis raised other related questions:

1. What role do general racial feelings play in causing officers to feel threatened?
2. Could officers who feel secure with general racial feelings be threatened by affirmative action in a racial sense?
3. Are some officers secure in relation to general racial feelings and/or racial affirmative action threat feelings, yet, threatened by affirmative action because it threatens their work ethic sense?
4. What relation, if any, do personal characteristics such as age, etc, have to these feelings?

Therefore, the purpose of this study became to test the hypothesis and investigate correlations between it and questions, which might become sub-hypotheses, such as those

above.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The middle management is of particular importance to any organization. It is the leader or manager in the middle of an organizational hierarchy who implements the policies of the organization.⁶

United States Army Command and General Staff College graduates are believed to represent the upper 50 percent of Army middle management.⁷ It would follow that if a significant feeling of threat or backlash concerning race relations policy were detected in this key group, it would cast grave doubt upon the Army's ability to successfully implement an affirmative action program.

ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF THESIS

A capsule history of race relations in the U.S. Army will be presented in Chapter II. Chapter III contains a discussion of the meaning of affirmative action as defined by the Army. Chapter IV contains an explanation of the methodology used in this study. Chapter V discusses analysis of data and findings. Finally, Chapter VI contains the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of this study.

CHAPTER II

A CAPSULE HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE U.S. ARMY

The officers surveyed in this study stand at the end of a continuum which began in 1775 with the founding of the Army. Thus, to better place the racial attitudes of the 1974-75 white students in perspective, they must be viewed in historical context. The following pages briefly review race relations within the Army since its inception.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO CIVIL WAR

It was the general policy in the early days of the American colonies to exclude Negroes from military service. However, manpower shortages often outweighed the reluctance to allow Blacks to bear arms.⁸ Thus, colonies in both the North and South yielded to expediency. By the time of The Revolutionary War the use of Negroes in the colonial militia had become the established norm.⁹

During the opening months of the war with England, Blacks fought alongside whites. Negroes were killed and wounded during these early battles and several distinguished themselves. Perhaps most noteworthy of them all was Salem Poor, a soldier in a Massachusetts company. After Bunker Hill he was cited by 14 officers for his outstanding performance.¹⁰

Despite the fine showing of Negroes during the first months of the war, their service was ended in 1775 when General Washington issued orders forbidding Negro enlistment in the newly formed Continental Army.¹¹

This policy of exclusion was short-lived. By 1777 it was becoming very difficult to raise volunteers and opposition to Negro enlistment waned. Blacks served again during the later years of the war.¹²

After the war was over and independence won, the Negro was no longer desperately needed in the Army. Congress passed legislation barring Negroes from service. This act brought the Army's treatment of Negroes full circle. A pattern was established which would be repeated again and again in our country's history. When needed during the crises of war Negroes would be utilized. Once the danger was past they would be eliminated from service.¹³

When conflict again ensued during the War of 1812, Negroes were used again in the Army and Navy. They fought well in both services and received acclaim. However, by 1823 the U.S. Attorney General stated that "it was not the intention of Congress to incorporate Negroes and people of color with the Army . . ."¹⁴ This sentiment was reflected in Army Regulations which forbade Negro enlistment up until the Civil War.¹⁵

CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR I

With the outbreak of war in 1861, Negroes hurried

to offer their services. Denied enlistment in the Union Army they waited and tried to assist the government in any way open to them. But, Blacks continued to press for the right to enlist in the Army.¹⁶ At a meeting in Boston, they passed a resolution urging their enlistment:

Our feelings urge us to say to our countrymen that we are ready to stand and defend our government . . . to do so with 'our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor,' . . . we ask you to modify your laws that we may enlist, . . . that full scope may be given to the patriotic feelings burning in the colored man's breast.¹⁷

No heed was paid to the blackman's plea to bear arms until 1862. President Lincoln refused to allow Negro enlistment during the first year of the war for fear of causing resentment in the border states. By the second year of the war, manpower needs again dictated a more realistic approach to Negro enlistment, and the recruitment of Blacks for a limited number of specific separate units was authorized. The Emancipation Proclamation, 1 January 1863, was followed five months later by an Army General Order which allowed general Negro enlistment in the Union Army.¹⁸

Once enlistment was authorized Blacks again flocked to the colors. By the war's end at least 186,000 had served in the Union Army.¹⁹ They fought in nearly every battle for the remainder of the war and more than 38,000 were killed in action. The Negro soldiers fought well and there is little doubt that they contributed materially to the restoration of the Union.²⁰

After the Civil War Negro units were drastically reduced. Within a short time only four units remained from

a previous high of 150. The remaining units were the 14th and 15th Infantry and the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments. The latter two units were very active in the Indian Wars from 1870-1896.²¹

During the Spanish American War Negroes fought with Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. They fought well and Roosevelt was prompted to say, "I want no better troops than these."

The years from 1862 until the end of reconstruction were years of small but steady progress. The first Black was enrolled at West Point in 1870 and three graduated by 1889. However, nearly a half century was to pass before the next Black would graduate.²²

With the end of reconstruction, feelings of white backlash swept the country. Much that had been gained by Blacks was lost quickly. These feelings of white backlash gained respectability when they were articulated by the rising Populist movement which was based partially upon white supremacy. In 1896, the Plessy vs Ferguson decision of the U.S. Supreme Court gave birth to the "separate but equal" doctrine which would be the cornerstone of race relations in America until 1954.²³

WORLD WAR I TO WORLD WAR II

The downward trend of the Negro in the Army, and society in general, continued into World War I. Of the nearly 300,000 Negroes who were mobilized and sent to France only two divisions were used in a combat role, the remainder

being utilized as support troops.²⁴

It is difficult to assess the performance of Negro combat soldiers in World War I. For the first time many did poorly. The two Black combat divisions have opposite records. One unit, the 93rd Division, covered itself with honors and was the first United States unit to cross the Rhine. Its men earned hundreds of "Croix de Guerre."²⁵ The other Black combat division, the 92nd, has a history filled with reports of cowardice and lack of discipline. The former unit was mostly made up of volunteers, was led by French officers, and was divided up by regiments with each regiment being integrated into a French division. The later unit was composed primarily of draftees, led by white American officers, and was kept together as an all Black unit.²⁶

The dissimilar experiences of the 92nd and 93rd Divisions as to treatment by their officers can be expanded to show the general difference in the manner in which the French and white American officers treated the Negroes. The French associated pleasantly with the colored troops and welcomed their free movement about France. The American whites did everything possible to keep the Blacks "in their place," even so far as to instruct the French as to what that proper place was. This concern was officially articulated in a paper entitled Secret Information Concerning Black Troops, which advised the necessity of maintaining complete separation of Negroes and whites. It further

cautioned against having any contact with Negroes outside of official duty.²⁷

From the end of World War I until World War II Black participation in the Army declined to but a token.²⁸ The end of the war signalled the beginning of a period of American history called by Benjamin Quarles, "the flood tide of racism."²⁹ This is a dark period and although the beginning of a Negro renaissance can be seen occurring in the mid-1920's, it is not until the post World War II period that the Army again moves toward equality for the Black man.³⁰

WORLD WAR II TO KOREAN WAR

With the beginning of World War II, the federal government took strong measures to end racial discrimination in war industries. However, nothing effective was done to end the policy of bias in the armed forces, and segregation remained as the official policy throughout the war.³¹

At the beginning of the war there was a "wait and see" attitude among many Negro leaders and journalists. They generally took the stand that unless Blacks were to receive better treatment than they had in our past wars, wholehearted support for the war should not be expected. Other blacks, of a more reflective frame of mind, supported the war. They, and most other Blacks, seemed to sense that if America lost the war the Negro could be the biggest loser. Most believed if Blacks were to realize any good

from the war they would have to contribute to winning it, thus proving themselves.³²

Although segregation was the official policy throughout the war a significant amount of de-facto integration occurred. The most notable example being the integration of most officer candidate schools, even those located in the South.³³

As they had done in previous wars the Negroes in combat units acquitted themselves well. However, the vast majority of Negroes were utilized in service forces as support troops.³⁴ For example, by 1945 Negroes comprised 2.8 percent of combat forces and 45.6 percent of the Quartermaster Corps. About 78 percent of the Negroes in the Army were assigned to service jobs.³⁵

Despite progress made by Negroes, race relations continued as a major problem throughout the war. Almost monthly there was an incident at some service post and there were major incidents at posts in Virginia, Hawaii, Louisiana and Georgia.³⁶

In the last months of the war General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, directed a study be made into the utilization of the Negro in the post-war Army. This study, the Gillam Report, made 13 proposals. Although the report did not recommend discontinuing segregation in the Army, it struck at least two hopeful notes when it suggested broadening opportunities for Negroes to become officers and grouping Negro units together with white ones. The report

was a step forward and represented a portent of things to come.³⁷

In 1946 President Truman appointed a select committee of Negro and white Americans to investigate and make recommendations in the civil rights area. The committee's report, To Secure These Rights, called for the elimination of segregation and a positive program to insure the civil rights of minorities.³⁸

President Truman issued a benchmark executive order in July 1948 which declared: "There shall be equal treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Forces without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin."³⁹ However, the order did not specifically outlaw segregation. It did go far toward ending injustice in the Army.⁴⁰ This order also convened a committee to study race problems in the Armed Forces and its report, Freedom to Serve, was to become the blueprint of the steps by which integration would later be achieved.⁴¹

By 1949 all the services had adopted policies which were leading toward complete integration. Progress was significant. There were few incidents, and by 1950 the newly integrated Armed Forces would be further molded by the stress of battle.⁴²

KOREAN WAR TO VIETNAM

As had happened in the past, the necessities of war, this time in Korea, once again acted as a catalyst for change.

As recruits flooded into training camps, individual commanders took the initiative and formed them into platoons as they arrived without regard for race.⁴³

As Black units arrived in Korea they were broken up and their members assigned to white units. Although this was done because white officers believed that Negroes fought well when mixed with whites and fought poorly in segregated units, the action resulted in ending the widespread segregation of Negroes in the Army.⁴⁴ Negroes fought well in Korea as they had in previous wars.

In noncombat areas, integration of the Army proceeded at a slower pace. Integration increased gradually in CONUS and in Europe during 1951 and 1952. It began to accelerate in 1952 and by 1954 only 10,000 Blacks of the 250,000 in the Army remained in segregated units. By October of 1954 no segregated units remained in the Army.⁴⁵ The same year the Supreme Court handed down its pivotal Brown vs Board of Education of Topeka (Kansas) decision, ending "separate but equal" as a legal tenet.⁴⁶

During the remaining years of the fifties attention was focused on the school integration issue. Efforts continued to advance equality in the Army during this period but were limited primarily to important but low profile administrative issues such as minority representation in officer procurement. In 1963 the Army signalled a change in its approach by ordering that housing lists at its installations would include only those housing units available

on a nondiscriminatory basis. This was not effective, since white soldiers simply consulted civilian realtors who maintained their own lists. The effort was important, however, as it marked the first time the Army attempted to influence communities adjacent to its posts concerning racial discrimination.⁴⁷ Later in 1963 the Department of Defense officially directed all commanders to oppose discriminatory practices affecting their men, not only on their installations but also in the local communities.⁴⁸

VIETNAM TO PRESENT

In 1965, fighting in Vietnam escalated to the point of large scale conflict. This resulted in a reversal of complaints about Army discrimination. In earlier wars the complaint had always been that Negroes were not allowed to fight. In Vietnam the complaint became that Negroes were being forced to bear the brunt of the fighting. While it was true that Blacks were being killed and wounded out of proportion to their numbers in the Army, this new phenomenon could possibly be explainable on two counts. First, a large percentage of Negroes were poorly educated upon entering the Army and resultant low test scores relegated them to the combat units. Secondly, Blacks had volunteered in large numbers for elite units such as the Airborne and Rangers. These units were in the thick of the fighting and took heavy casualties.⁴⁹

Despite the increasing pressures of the war, growth

of other minority unrest, and widespread civil disturbances, the Army had virtually no violent racial incidents until 1968. The murder of Martin Luther King in that year triggered the most widespread rioting in the nation's history and the Army was affected. Problems and incidents began to increase despite Army efforts to enlarge equal opportunity programs. Serious incidents involving racial violence were recorded at eleven stateside Army posts during 1969.⁵⁰

The Department of Defense and the Army sent investigators on factfinding trips to installations throughout the world in 1969. They reported in September of that year that the increase in racial tensions was primarily due to a failure to keep open effective communications between the races. Their report recommended that efforts be made at all levels to increase understanding.⁵¹ In November 1969, a race relations program of instruction was developed to be given to all junior officers, warrant officers, and NCOs. Other courses were written for inclusion in basic training and seminars on race relations were instituted at all major Army installations.

Efforts were made in 1970 to increase black enrollment in both West Point and ROTC. The first Army-wide race relations conference was held in November 1970. It was attended by representatives of all major commands as well as personnel from other services.⁵²

In 1971 a giant step was taken in the fight to

assure nondiscriminatory housing practices adjacent to Army installations. Commanders were authorized to impose restrictive sanctions against owners or managers of housing who were found to be discriminating on the basis of race. Other important changes were new safeguards in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and in the requiring of minority participation on all promotion boards.⁵³ Finally, in May of 1971, all major commands were required to appoint an Equal Opportunity Officer to advise commanders.⁵⁴

Continued progress has been made from 1971 to the present. Most, if not all, of the overt discriminatory practices and barriers have been removed. The primary thrust of equal opportunity now seems to be in the area of affirmative action, going a step beyond nondiscrimination.⁵⁵

CHAPTER III

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES OF THE ARMY

You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race, and then say 'you are free to compete with all the others' and justly believe that you have been completely fair. Thus, it is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All of our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates.⁵⁶

These words, spoken by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Howard University in 1965, illustrate the necessity of affirmative action policies. His analogy, compelling as it is, sounds even more compelling when paraphrased by a young Black soldier.

During a race relations seminar at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama in 1973, a seminar monitor expressed a similar analogy by indicating that one cannot just walk up to a group of Blacks and tell them that all their problems are over because "all this discrimination jive" has been eliminated. Now all the Blacks will be allowed an "equal chance" to race down a football field with the white soldiers for the "goodies." He added, that about this time one of the Blacks would likely indicate that in reality the Blacks were starting the race on the goal line while the whites were starting up on the fifty yard line.⁵⁷

The seminar leader's remarks illustrated well why some believe affirmative actions are needed to correct past injustices and cultural deprivations and, thus insure that

white and black soldiers be given a chance to run their competitive race on equal terms.

SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS

When discussing affirmative action many people tend to use words and terms rather loosely. Thus, it is imperative to know how the Army officially defines these words and terms if understanding of the Army's affirmative action program is to be achieved. In discussing affirmative action the terms quotas, goals, and affirmative action itself are pivotal. They are defined as follows:

Quota. A definite fixed number, a fixed proportion, a fixed range, an upward limit or ceiling which restricts upward mobility or a downward limit which requires not less than a certain number. The major characteristic of a quota is the requirement for mandatory attainment.⁵⁸

Goal. An objective or planning target the Army strives to attain. It is realistic, based on attainability, subject to revision, and may be numerical. It is differentiated from a quota in that mandatory attainment is not required.⁵⁹

Affirmative Action. An affirmative Race Relations/Equal Opportunity action is designed to go a step beyond nondiscrimination. It is a positive, planned action to identify and correct deficiencies in existing systems and policies to insure that each individual is given the opportunity for personal and professional growth based on his or her potential and capabilities.⁶⁰

The above definitions are rather specific and rigid. They were, no doubt, designed to be so. However, it is functional to keep them as a reference as this discussion progresses.

REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

Affirmative action policies of the Army are designed to help minority groups overcome the effects of cultural deprivations. It is hoped that the success of these policies will reduce frustrations among minority group members by bettering their lot in life, thereby lowering racial tensions. However, these policies have the potential of stimulating the "backlash" effect in the white majority. This could have the effect of increasing rather than lowering racial tension. As racially discriminatory practices are altered or changed, the charge that "reverse discrimination" is being practiced may be heard. Thus, it is imperative that the white majority understands and accepts the reasons for affirmative action policies and programs.⁶¹

When people speak of "reverse racism" they usually are describing practices which they perceive as giving preference and privilege to minority groups. They pose the question, "If it is wrong to give preference to majority members solely on the basis of their color, isn't it equally wrong to give privilege to minorities on the same basis?" "How can a wrong be used to correct a wrong?" "Do two wrongs make a right?" These questions are valid and deserve answering.⁶²

The answer is that it is necessary to take special actions with respect to minority groups in the present if the Army is to be able to correct discrimination's harmful effects of the past. These actions must be taken until

such time as the harmful effects are corrected. If the scales of justice are imbalanced, adding equal weights to both sides can never balance them. The scales must be brought into balance before equal results can be attained from equal treatment. However, in situations where special action is judged to be necessary, it must never be seen as a permanent policy. Rather, it should be viewed as a temporary corrective measure. Affirmative actions should not be understood as special preference or privileges. They are intended only to be forces applied to an imbalanced situation, designed to balance the situation. The desired end result of affirmative action is to totally eliminate race as a basis for allocating benefits or privileges of any kind.⁶³

It is probably apparent that this rather lengthy justification of the Army's affirmative action policy avoids an explanation of the philosophical side of the question (i.e., "Do two wrongs make a right?" or, "Does the end justify the means?") and focuses instead on answering why affirmative action is needed. In studying the problem, before arriving at affirmative action as the proposed solution, the Army has struggled with this philosophical argument.

In an interview, Colonel Loma O. Allen, Director of Race Relations and Equal Opportunity Programs for the Army, indicated that in a very narrow philosophical sense neither "The end justifies the means," nor "Two wrongs make a right,"

are valid. He also allowed that while he knew of no specific case in point, some few whites may suffer because of affirmative actions. However, he believes that, in a practical sense, the number of white soldiers who have suffered, or will suffer, because of affirmative action is so small as to be insignificant. Comparing the number of Blacks who have suffered past discrimination, the small number of whites who may suffer for a limited time in the future to insure equal opportunity for all, seems a reasonable price to pay. Colonel Allen stated emphatically that the entire program is under constant scrutiny to insure that white soldiers are adversely affected to the minimum degree possible by these programs.⁶⁴

However, even if it is conceded that affirmative action is not totally defensible in a strictly philosophical sense, does that mean that the program constitutes "reverse racism?" To answer this it is functional to reflect on the meaning of racism. In addition to the classic inferiority-superiority attitude, racism is a relationship between two or more groups of people wherein one group has defined the rules by which the other group may act. This has always been the black/white relationship in America. The effect of this relationship has been economic, psychological, social, and political subjugation of minorities. For the charge of "reverse discrimination" to be valid on a large scale, a complete reversal of the historical relationship would have to occur and be directly attributed to affirmative action. Such a result is highly unlikely.⁶⁵

SUMMARY

Affirmative action is a policy which advocates corrective actions in order to balance or offset old wrongs, discriminations, and deprivations. It became the policy of the Army because it was felt that no other program would be effective in helping minorities take full advantage of their newly-won statutory equality. The goal of affirmative action is not to reverse the relationship between the races; it is to eradicate those relationships entirely. The Army believes that the success of this program will move the Army closer to the ideal of freedom and equality for all.⁶⁶

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This study is original in design and deliberately limited in scope. It is intended as an initial attempt to accumulate and present empirical data and not as a completely definitive work. However, the data collected can provide a start point for future studies in this important area.

THE SAMPLE

The survey population was the white student officers of the 1974-75 CGSC class. It was assumed that each of the 24 sections in the class was a stratified sample representative of the Army officer corps. The college administration goes to great lengths to create such stratification. Sections, consisting of about 50 U.S. officers each, are carefully constructed so as to contain, as nearly as possible, equal representation of officers from all types of diverse background and experience. In addition to such obvious factors as ethnicity, care is taken to equally distribute officers by branch of service, military occupational specialty, rank, and source of commission.⁶⁷

It was recognized that even though every attempt had been made to make each section a true cross-section of

the student body, some differences might exist. Thus, permission was obtained to administer the survey to an entire division, consisting of five sections and representing 20 percent of the student body. It was believed that these two conditions assured a high degree of sample representativeness of the student body as a whole.⁶⁸

SURVEY CONSTRUCTION

Since much of the initial interest in doing this study came from overhearing comments, pro and con, about race relations from fellow students, it seemed appropriate to draw the bulk of survey questions used from the same source. Many statements made by other students were recorded by the writer during the early months of this study. It was these statements that were eventually synthesized into the final survey questions. Thus, in a very real sense, the students of this class wrote the survey. It remained only to test these questions drawn from scattered student sources against a representative sample to determine what percentages of the student body agreed or disagreed.

It was decided early to keep the questionnaire brief and simple to answer. The students who were asked to respond to this survey have many demands made on their time. They are also subjected to numerous other surveys and fact finding activities of both students and the college administration. With these considerations in mind, only

one type of attitude measurement technique was used. A five-point attitudinal response to carefully constructed statements was deemed adequate.⁶⁹ By using only one technique, less time was required in explaining how the survey was to be answered. Therefore, those being sampled could spend more time actually thinking about what they were answering than the mechanical process of how the answers were to be put on paper.

Within those basic guidelines, an initial survey was drafted in January of this year. This first effort was shown to faculty advisors who made numerous constructive comments and recommended extensive rewording. A second effort was completed in early February and it too underwent faculty scrutiny.⁷⁰ This time, after incorporating faculty suggested changes, the survey was pre-tested by about a dozen students. The students were approached at random and asked if they would mind reading the survey carefully in order that any suggestions they might have for improvements could be incorporated. As a result of the student comments several additional changes were made.

By mid-February the third rewrite of the survey was completed. It was now forwarded to the writer's consulting civilian faculty advisor for his comments and suggestions.⁷¹ By late February these suggestions had been received, discussed with the resident faculty, and incorporated into a final survey instrument. It was assumed that these revisions, based on student opinion and advice from both military and

civilian faculty, assured that a reasonable degree of reliability had been built into the survey during its construction.

SURVEY ADMINISTRATION

The questionnaire was administered to five College sections in early March. The writer administered the survey in Section 4, his own section. In the other four sections the test was administered by each respective section leader. Because of the brevity of instructions given, it is unlikely that this difference of proctors made any significant difference. The oral instructions given were short and simple, consisting only of the following:

1. A brief explanation of the survey and a request for the cooperation and assistance of the students.
2. An oral restatement for emphasis of the fact that anonymity was assured.
3. A reminder to the students to answer all questions on the survey.

All students were tested in their respective section classrooms. All of the classrooms are equipped and arranged identically. Even the furniture is situated the same. Only minor differences such as the color of rugs or bulletin board notices deviate from this sameness; therefore, there was no appreciable difference in environment from one section to the next. Also, all students took the survey at 0800 hours in the morning. Thus, all were probably at

the same level of attentiveness.

Other than the brief introduction comments of each proctor, the only other instructions were those on page one of the survey. (See Appendix A) The survey was administered from 0800-0815 hours and then collected by each section leader. The completed surveys were then collected by the author. The usual procedure for administering surveys at the college is to place them in each student's box. The students then complete them at their leisure and return them through the distribution system. It was decided that this procedure would be detrimental to the objective of getting the student's "gut" response. It was also considered unlikely that all of the students would return the surveys, because of the delicate nature of race relations, if they were distributed in this usual way. Thus, special permission was secured to administer the questionnaire directly in the classroom.

SURVEY QUESTIONS

The questionnaire was divided into two parts. Part I contained 20 statements requiring one of five possible responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Part II contained seven demographic questions. These questions were used to divide the respondents into subsets for comparative purposes.

An assessment was made of the meaning of each of the twenty statements in Part I. Each of the questions was judged to fall into one of three sub-scales. Questions 1,

2, 13, 15, 17, and 20 were believed to measure general racial feelings. Questions 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, and 16 were considered indicators of the threat of affirmative action based on racial attitudes. Questions 6, 9, 11, 14, 18, and 19 were believed to measure the threat of affirmative action policies based on work ethic or "advancement through achievement only" attitudes.

It was realized that some racial prejudices probably underlie all of the first twenty questions. While this may be true, it was still considered desirable to design the questions so that some were slanted away from general race bias and toward affirmative action threat. Admittedly, this categorization of the questions is somewhat of a value judgment but, one concurred in by the writer's advisory committee. It was felt to be a necessary step if comparisons were to be made.

Some of the questions on the survey overlap by intention. Other questions are worded in such a way as to reverse the way in which a strongly threatened person would respond. This was done to counteract any left handed tendency that might have developed if all similar responses had been either strongly agree or strongly disagree.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

To facilitate tabulation of over 200 questionnaires a numerical value was given to each response. The table on the next page shows both the arbitrary Likert-Scale

values assigned and the verbal interpretation of a given response.

TABLE IV-1

Strongly Agree	= Strongly Threatened	= 1
Agree	= Threatened	= 2
Undecided	= Neutral	= 3
Disagree	= Secure	= 4
Strongly Disagree	= Strongly Secure	= 5

In transferring the raw data first from the questionnaires to tables and then from the tables to computer memory, data were given a value according to the predetermined meaning and not whether the response was literally strongly agree, etc. This was because, as mentioned, several questions were reversed in wording so that a strongly disagree response might deserve a one value instead of the normal five. Thus, once the values for each response were entered into the computer it could manipulate answers to each question without consideration as to which ones were reversed. This facilitated design of a program.

Data to be used were placed in a workable format and entered into computer memory. After this file had been checked and edited, it became the master file, against which reference would be made during all operations. (See Appendix B) Several minor and one major revision were

necessary before the desired program was achieved. The initial program was designed to identify and count responses as they occurred, by question, along the strongly agree to strongly disagree continuum. This program also performed these functions for individual demographic subgroupings. Upon examining the data resulting from this first program, it was realized that further steps were necessary to facilitate data analysis. Although the first program proved to be only an interim effort, its output aided in conceptualizing how the data would be further handled.

The problem with the first program data was that it did not lend itself to analysis in order to answer the central question, degree of affirmative action threat. The second program was designed to overcome this deficiency.

This final program performed the necessary functions and provided results in terms of a Likert-Scale. As developed by Rensis Likert, the scale is a summated, ordinal scale that allows the ranking of individuals in terms of degree of expressed favorable or unfavorable attitudes. The Likert-Scale is a widely used measurement device in behavioral studies.⁷²

Tables were constructed to compare demographic variables against three sets of contrived variables. Each of the contrived scale score variables were derived from summated scores of subsets of individual questions. The contrived variables were called General Racial Feelings, Racial Threat, and Work Ethnic Threat. Respectively, these

variables consist of 6, 8, and 5 items each. (See page 28 for specifics)

Distributions of these contrived variables were needed to determine if the shape and degree of variability was appropriate for further analysis. Cutting points for sub-dividing each of the three contrived variables were made by evenly dividing their respective ranges into three parts. Table 2 shows ranges and cutting points. (High, Medium, or Low threat = H, M, or L)

TABLE IV-2 Scale of Ranges and Cutting Points

	<u>Range</u>	<u>Cutting Points</u>
General Racial Feelings	6-30	H 6-14 M 15-22 L 23-30
Racial Threat	8-40	H 8-19 M 20-30 L 31-40
Work Ethnic Threat	5-25	H 5-11 M 12-18 L 19-25

Next, the three contrived variables were compared with six demographic variables to determine whether or not a differential relationship existed. Finally, the three contrived variables were compared with each other. A total of twenty-one comparisons were made. These comparisons are shown in Table IV-3.

TABLE IV-3 Relationships Tested

-
1. Age vs General Racial Feelings (GRF)
 2. Age vs Racial Affirmative Action Threat (T-1)
 3. Age vs Work Ethic Affirmative Action Threat (T-2)
 4. Geographic Origin vs GRF
 5. Geographic Origin vs T-1
 6. Geographic Origin vs T-2
 7. Commission Source vs GRF
 8. Commission Source vs T-1
 9. Commission Source vs T-2
 10. Civilian Education vs GRF
 11. Civilian Education vs T-1
 12. Civilian Education vs T-2
 13. Military Rank vs GRF
 14. Military Rank vs T-1
 15. Military Rank vs T-2
 16. Enlisted Service vs GRF
 17. Enlisted Service vs T-1
 18. Enlisted Service vs T-2
 19. GRF vs T-1
 20. GRF vs T-2
 21. T-1 vs T-2
 22. Total Response to GRF, T₁, and T₂
-

The nature of the original data and the contrived variables is such that chi square can be used as a measure of independence and it was selected as the writer's test method. In each of the twenty-one applications of chi square, the null hypothesis was that the variables being compared were independent of each other and that there was no differential relationship.⁷³

CHAPTER V

ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

The research questionnaire was administered to all U. S. officers present in Division A on March 5, 1975. Allied officers were not asked to respond. Black U.S. officers completed the questionnaire but their answers were not included in the study's results as their perceptions were not the issue at hand.

Over 200 officers were surveyed, however the number of surveys actually included in the study was 172. Thirty-one surveys were discarded either for not being from the pertinent sample or for other administrative reasons, such as incomplete response.

PROCESSING THE DATA

Questionnaires were scored and tabulated by hand. Each response was assigned a numerical value with the responses indicative of the highest degree of perceived threat feelings receiving the lowest numerical value.

Once tabulation was complete the data was analyzed by computer. The computer program contained the following parameters:

1. Questions were subdivided into three contrived variables: General Racial Feelings (GRF); Racial Affirmative Action Threat (T-1); Work Ethic/ Affirmative Action Threat (T-2). (See page 31)

2. Cutting points divided sums of responses for each of the contrived variables by high, medium, or low threat. (See page 32)

3. Contrived variables were printed, for comparison, in 21 different matrices. (See page 33)

Once computer manipulation was accomplished, the 21 matrices were each tested for differential relationship of their respective variables, using chi square as the test statistic of choice. Although a CGSC computer program was available for computing chi square, the test was applied by hand as a learning experience for the researcher.

LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE

In each case the null hypothesis (H_0) was tested at a 5% level of significance. This is to say, if chi square (X^2) for any of the 21 compared variables was found to be .05 or less, the alternate hypothesis (H_1) would be accepted. Thus, .05 described the degree of confidence of asserting that a differential relationship did or did not exist between the variables compared.⁷⁴

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO SUB HYPOTHESES

In testing the central hypothesis of this study, it was functional to test 21 related sub hypotheses. Thus, data, findings, and conclusions for H_1 - H_{21} are listed.

Hypothesis 1 (H_1). GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the ages of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-1 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_1 and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-1 Age vs General Racial Feelings

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Age	35	9	67	30
	35	8	39	19
$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = .669$ $df = 2$ $P > .05, \therefore H_0$ not rejected				

Conclusion 1. Age is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF threat. Therefore, H_1 is not accepted.

Hypothesis 2 (H_2). T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the ages of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-2 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_2 and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V 2 Age vs T₁

		T ₁		
		High	Medium	Low
Age	35	27	71	8
	35	19	42	5

N = 172
 $\chi^2 = .199$
 df = 2
 $P > .05, \therefore H_0$ not rejected

Conclusion 2. Age is inconsistently related to T₁, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₁. Therefore, H₂ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 3. T₂ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the ages of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-3 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₃ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-3 Age vs T₂

	T ₂		
	High	Medium	Low
Age			
35	33	68	5
35	27	35	4
N = 172 X ² = 1.548 df = 2 P > .05, ∴ H ₀ not rejected			

Conclusion 3. Age is inconsistently related to T₂, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₂. Therefore, H₃ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 4. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the geographic origins of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-4 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₄ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-4 Geographic Origin vs GRF

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Geo. Origin	Northeast	4	32	15
	Southeast	3	20	12
	Midwest	6	17	11
	Southwest	1	11	2
	West Coast	2	8	2
	Mobile	1	14	5

N = 166 (6 lost because of Alaska or Hawaii)

$\chi^2 = 7.433$

df = 10

P > .05 $\therefore H_0$ not rejected

Conclusion 4. Geographic origin is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF. Therefore, H_4 is not accepted.

Hypothesis 5. T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the geographic origins of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-5 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_5 and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-5 Geographic Origin vs T₁

		T ₁		
		High	Medium	Low
Geo. Origin	Northeast	9	39	3
	Southeast	8	23	4
	Midwest	12	20	2
	Southwest	6	6	2
	West Coast	5	7	0
	Mobile	4	15	1

N = 166 (6 lost because of Alaska or Hawaii)

$\chi^2 = 11.088$

df = 10

P > .05 \therefore H₀ not rejected

Conclusion 5. Geographic origin is inconsistently related to T₁, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₁. Therefore, H₅ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 6. T₂ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the geographic origins of the students.

Data and Findings. Table V-6 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₆ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-6 Geographic Origin vs T₂

		T ₂		
		High	Medium	Low
Geo. Origin	Northeast	20	29	2
	Southeast	10	23	2
	Midwest	10	23	1
	Southwest	6	7	1
	West Coast	4	8	1
	Mobile	8	9	3

N = 166 (6 lost because of Alaska or Hawaii)

$\chi^2 = 8.095$

df = 10

P > .05 $\therefore H_0$ not rejected

Conclusion 6. Geographic origin is inconsistently related to T₂, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₂. Therefore, H₆ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 7. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' source of commission.

Data and Findings. Table V-7 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₇ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-7 Commission Source vs GRF

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Comm. Source	U.S.M.A.	4	24	9
	R.O.T.C.	6	52	27
	Other	7	30	13
		$N = 172$ $X^2 = 2.319$ $df = 4$ $P > .05 \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$		

Conclusion 7. Commission source is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF. Therefore, H_7 is not accepted.

Hypothesis 8. T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' source of commission.

Data and Findings. Table V-8 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_8 and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-8 Commission Source vs T₁

		T ₁		
		High	Medium	Low
Comm. Source	U.S.M.A.	9	25	3
	R.O.T.C.	24	57	4
	Other	13	31	6

$$N = 172$$

$$X^2 = 2.536$$

$$df = 4$$

$$P > .05, \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$$

Conclusion 8. Commission source is inconsistently related to T₁, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₁. Therefore, H₈ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 9. T₂ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' source of commission.

Data and Findings. Table V-9 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₉ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-9 Commission Source vs T₂

		T ₂		
		High	Medium	Low
Comm. Source	U.S.M.A.	11	24	2
	R.O.T.C.	26	55	4
	Other	23	24	3
		$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = 4.27$ $df = 4$ $P > .05 \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$		

Conclusion 9. Commission source is inconsistently related to T₂, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₂. Therefore, H₉ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 10. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' civilian educational level.

Data and Findings. Table V-10 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₁₀ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-10 Civilian Education vs GRF

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Civ. Ed. Level	Bachelors	10	47	21
	Masters	7	58	26

N = 169 (3 officers were medical doctors)

$\chi^2 = 1.397$

df = 2

P > .05 $\therefore H_0$ not rejected

Conclusion 10. Civilian educational level is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF. Therefore, H_{10} is not accepted.

Hypothesis 11. T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' civilian educational level.

Data and Findings. Table V-11 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_{11} and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-11 Civilian Education vs T₁

		T ₁		
		High	Medium	Low
Civ. Ed. Level	Bachelors	25	46	7
	Masters	21	65	5
		N = 169 (3 officers were medical doctors)		
		$\chi^2 = 2.95$		
		df = 2		
		P > .05 $\therefore H_0$ not rejected		

Conclusion 11. Civilian educational level is inconsistently related to T₁, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₁. Therefore, H₁₁ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 12. T₂ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' civilian educational level.

Data and Findings. Table V-12 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₁₂ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-12 Civilian Education vs T₂

		T ₂		
		High	Medium	Low
Civ. Ed. Level	Bachelors	35	39	4
	Masters	25	61	5
		N = 169 (3 officers were medical doctors)		
		$\chi^2 = 5.649$		
		df = 2		
		P > .05 \therefore H ₀ not rejected		

Conclusion 12. Civilian educational level is inconsistently related to T₂, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₂. Therefore H₁₂ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 13. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' military rank.

Data and Findings. Table V-13 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₁₃ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-13 Military Rank vs GRF

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Rank	Company Grade	5	23	11
	Field Grade	12	83	38
		$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = .487$ $df = 2$ $P > .05 \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$		

Conclusion 13. Military rank is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF. Therefore, H_{13} is not accepted.

Hypothesis 14. T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' military rank.

Data and Findings. Table V-14 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_{14} and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V 14 Military Rank vs T_1

		T_1		
		High	Medium	Low
Rank	Company Grade	9	27	3
	Field Grade	37	86	10

$$N = 172$$

$$\chi^2 = .351$$

$$df = 2$$

$$P^f > .05 \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$$

Conclusion 14. Military rank is inconsistently related to T_1 , as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T_1 . Therefore, H_{14} is not accepted.

Hypothesis 15. T_2 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to the students' military rank.

Data and Findings. Table V-15 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_{15} and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-15 Military Rank vs T_2

		T_2		
		High	Medium	Low
Rank	Company Grade	14	22	3
	Field Grade	46	81	6

$$N = 172$$

$$\chi^2 = .707$$

$$d_f = 2$$

$$P^f > .05, \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$$

Conclusion 15. Military rank is inconsistently related to T_2 , as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T_2 . Therefore, H_{15} is not accepted.

Hypothesis 16. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to whether or not the student has had enlisted experience.

Data and Findings. Table V-16 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_{16} and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-16 Enlisted Service vs GRF

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
Enlisted	No	9	72	37
Service	Yes	8	34	12

$$N = 172$$

$$\chi^2 = 3.044$$

$$df = 2$$

$$P > .05, \therefore H_0 \text{ not rejected}$$

Conclusion 16. Enlisted experience is inconsistently related to GRF, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential GRF. Therefore, H_{16} is not accepted.

Hypothesis 17. T_1 feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to whether or not the student has had enlisted experience.

Data and Findings. Table V-17 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H_{17} and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-17 Enlisted Service vs T₁

		T ₁		
		High	Medium	Low
Enlisted	No	29	80	9
Service	Yes	17	33	4
		$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = .911$ $df = 2$ $P > .05. \therefore H_0$ not rejected		

Conclusion 17. Enlisted experience is inconsistently related to T₁, as measured by this study, and is an invalid indicator of potential T₁. Therefore, H₁₇ is not accepted.

Hypothesis 18. T₂ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to whether or not the student has enlisted experience.

Data and Findings. Table V-18 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₁₈ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-18 Enlisted Service vs T₂

		T ₂		
		High	Medium	Low
Enlisted	No	35	78	5
Service	Yes	25	25	4

$$N = 172$$

$$\chi^2 = 6.077$$

$$df = 2$$

$$P < .05, \therefore H_0 \text{ not accepted}$$

Conclusion 18. Enlisted experience is consistently related to T₂, as measured by this study, and is a valid indicator of potential T₂. Therefore, H₁₈ is not rejected.

Hypothesis 19. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to T₁ feelings expressed by the same.

Data and Findings. Table V-19 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₁₉ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-19 GRF vs T₁

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
T ₁	High	12	30	4
	Medium	5	71	37
	Low	0	5	8
		$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = 30.198$ $df = 4$ $P < .001, \therefore H_0 \text{ not accepted}$		

Conclusion 19. GRF threat feelings are very consistently related to T₁ feelings, as measured by this study, and are a valid indicator of potential T₁. Since the relationship is differential, the reverse is true. Therefore, H₁₉ is not rejected.

Hypothesis 20. GRF threat feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to T₂ feelings expressed by the same.

Data and Findings. Table V-20 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₂₀ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-20 GRF vs T₂

		GRF		
		High	Medium	Low
T ₂	High	16	35	9
	Medium	1	71	40
	Low	0	0	0

$$N = 172$$

$$\chi^2 = 32.308$$

$$df = 4$$

$$P < .001, \therefore H_0 \text{ not accepted}$$

Conclusion 20. GRF threat feelings are very consistently related to T₂ feelings, as measured by this study, and are a valid indicator of potential T₂. Since the relationship is differential, the reverse is true. Therefore, H₂₀ is not rejected.

Hypothesis 21. T₁ feelings expressed by white CGSC officer students are related to T₂ threat feelings expressed by the same.

Data and Findings. Table V-21 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to H₂₁ and the results of chi square application.

TABLE V-21 T_1 vs T_2

		T_1		
		High	Medium	Low
T_2	High	28	31	1
	Medium	17	79	7
	Low	1	3	5
		$N = 172$ $\chi^2 = 49.173$ $df = 4$ $P < .001, \therefore H_0$ not accepted		

Conclusion 21. T_1 feelings are very consistently related to T_2 feelings, as measured by this study, and are valid indicators of potential T_2 . Since the relationship is differential, the reverse is true. Therefore, H_{21} is not rejected.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

RELATED TO THE BASIC PROBLEM STATEMENT

The basic problem statement was to determine the percentage of white officer students in the 1974-75 Command and General Staff College Regular Course who felt threatened by the "affirmative action" policies of the Army. This derived from the basic hypothesis of this study, that CGSC officer students (representative of the upper 50% of Army middle management) might feel threatened by these policies.

Data and Findings. Table V-22 shows the Likert-Scale distribution of officers' responses pertinent to the main hypothesis.

TABLE V-22 Total Response to GRF, T₁ and T₂

GRF			
	High	Medium	Low
Officers	17	106	49
% of N	10%	62%	28%
N = 172			
T ₁			
	High	Medium	Low
Officers	36	113	13
% of N	27%	66%	7%
N = 172			
T ₂			
	High	Medium	Low
Officers	60	103	9
% of N	35%	60%	5%
N = 172			

Conclusions. A significant number of white CGSC officer students do feel threatened by the affirmative action policies of the Army.

1. Officers are most threatened by work ethic

threat, T₂, with 95% expressing at least moderate threat feelings. Also, 35% expressed a high degree of T₂.

2. Although not as high as T₂, racial affirmative action threat, T₁, was felt to a high degree with 93% expressing at least medium threat and 27% feeling highly threatened.

3. Expression of general racial feeling, GRF, was lower still. Even in this least threatening of the contrived variables, 72% expressed at least moderate threat feelings, and 10% felt highly threatened.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

The hypothesis tested in this study was that the white officer students in the 1974-75 Command and General Staff College Regular Course felt threatened by the affirmative action policies of the Army. Implicit in this hypothesis, was an unstated assumption by the researcher that any perceived affirmative action threat was separate and distinct from general racial threat feelings.

The findings of this study support the main stated hypothesis and reveal a significant degree of affirmative action threat. (See page 57) However, the implicit assumption by the researcher that affirmative action threat was separate from general racial feelings was proven false. The differential relationship between general racial feelings (GRF), racial affirmative action threat (T_1), and ethnic affirmative action threat (T_2) was found to be so great, a confidence level of .001, that any attempt to imply a distinction is highly doubtful.

Also tested were the relationships between the three contrived variables (GRF, T_1 and T_2) and six demographic variables. In applying the chi square test to the eighteen

resultant matrices, it was found that only one demographic variable was not independent. The differential relationship between enlisted experience and work ethic affirmative action threat (T_2) was found to be at the .05 level.

CONCLUSIONS

The writer concluded, based on the findings of this study, that a high degree of perceived threat exists among white CGSC officer students with respect to affirmative action. It was further concluded that because of the high confidence level, .001, that general racial feelings (GRF), racial affirmative action threat (T_1), and work ethic affirmative action threat (T_2) are not independent of each other. It would be unsafe to assert that affirmative action threat feelings among officers were unrelated to general racial feelings. In short, if an officer was threatened by general racial feelings he was likely, at the .001 level, to be threatened by affirmative action policies which he perceived either as a racial or work ethic threat.

Another major conclusion was that demographic variables of CGSC students are unlikely indicators of potential racial threat feelings. Save only prior enlisted service, all of the demographic variables proved to be independent from the contrived variables. The writer can offer no certain explanation of why this proved to be so. However, a possible explanation rests with the socialization process experienced by all of the respondents. Since all

officers have 8-12 years of Army experience/socialization before attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, it would appear that this institutional experience might be what eliminated demographic variables as a reliable indicator.

The one demographic variable which was related differentially to a contrived variable was prior enlisted service. Enlisted service can be associated with potential for perceived work ethic affirmative action threat (T_2), as measured by this study, at the .05 confidence level. A possible, though by no means certain, explanation of this lone exception is that officers with prior enlisted service perceive themselves as having "pulled themselves up by their bootstraps." They entered the Army at the bottom as enlisted men, learned the rules of the institution and applied them diligently in order to advance. Affirmative action policies now seem to threaten the sense of work ethic held by these men.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This was an initial study and its findings and conclusions indicate the nature and direction of the white officer student's racial threat feelings. The research findings are tentative and do not support a list of explicit recommendations. This study was but an investigation into the existence of racial and affirmative action threat feelings on the part of white CGSC officers.

However, it is recommended that this same study be conducted at basic and advanced course levels and at the Army War College. If such subsequent studies should confirm a high degree of threat feelings toward affirmative action, a case might be made for a far more sophisticated research project by a civilian research organization.

Finally, the writer recommends that the Army continue, nay intensify its efforts at race relations education, to include instruction on affirmative action. It is imperative that an understanding of the true meaning of affirmative action policies be understood by all Army personnel. A better explanation of affirmative action must be forthcoming if the Army is to avoid a possible leadership/communications problem which could have serious consequences for combat effectiveness. This study has found that affirmative action threat, feelings of "backlash", are intimately related to general racial feelings. In short, a person expressing high feelings of affirmative action threat is likely to also express very intolerant general racial views. If further studies prove this to be true for the Army in general, perhaps affirmative action threat will no longer be thought of as a separate problem. The writer firmly believes it is not separate but simply a part of the bigger problem.

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ENDNOTES

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³The officer making this statement did not realize that his comment would be quoted, therefore, he must remain anonymous.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶P.H. Cressy and L.R. Desiosses, "Developing an Alternative Approach to Race Relations Education: Identifying Military Middle Management Resistance," Naval War College Review, July/August 1974.

⁷Opinion expressed by Major General John Cushman in an address ("Commandant's Welcome") at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 12, 1974.

⁸Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America (New York: Collier Books, 1969), pp. 45.

⁹Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 47.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Richard J. Stillman, II. Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), pp. 8-9.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans (New York: Vintage Book Edition, 1969), p. 272.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 277.

¹⁸Peter M. Gergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in America (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 231.

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²⁰Ibid., pp. 293-294.

²¹Stillman, op. cit., p. 11.

²²Ibid., p. 12.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 18.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 15-16.

²⁷Franklin, op. cit., p. 468.

²⁸Stillman, op. cit., p. 17.

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³⁰Ibid., p. 436.

³¹Ibid., p. 473.

³²Quarles, op. cit., pp. 215-316.

³³Ibid., p. 219.

³⁴Ibid., p. 224.

³⁵Stillman, op. cit., p. 29.

³⁶Ibid., p. 27.

³⁷Quarles, op. cit., p. 226.

³⁸Franklin, op. cit., p. 609.

- 39Stillman, op. cit., p. 24.
- 40Ibid.
- 41Franklin, op. cit., p. 609.
- 42Ibid.
- 43Stillman, op. cit., p. 50.
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⁵⁵Based on personal interview between Colonel Loma O. Allen, Jr., Director of Army Equal Opportunity Programs, and the writer.

⁵⁶From a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Howard University (Washington, D.C.) on June 4, 1965.

⁵⁷From an explanation of the necessity for affirmative action by Staff Sergeant Larry Addy, Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Instructor at the U.S. Army Missile Munition Center and School (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama) Fall, 1974.

⁵⁸U.S. Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army Regulation No. 600-21; Race Relations and Equal Opportunity. (Washington, D.C.: 26 July 1973), p. 2.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3.

⁶¹U.S. Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 600-16; Improving Race Relations in the Army, Handbook for Leaders (Washington, D.C.: June 1973), p. 12.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Based on personal interview between Colonel Loma O. Allen, Jr., Director of Army Equal Opportunity Programs, and the writer.

⁶⁵D. A. Pamphlet No. 600-16, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

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⁶⁷Statement by LTC George Kuykendall, Military Coordinator of MMAS Program, personal interview, October 1975.

⁶⁸Statement by Major David Fisher, Comptroller of the Command and General Staff College, personal interview, March 1975.

⁶⁹Instruction by Major David Fisher, Comptroller of the Command and General Staff College, during the MMAS Research Methodology Course, Fall, 1974.

⁷⁰Revisions recommended by the resident faculty were coordinated and consolidated by Major Rodney Symons, Chairman of the writer's MMAS Committee.

⁷¹Revisions recommended by LTC William R. Larson, Professor of Behavioral Science, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, Ca.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

MMAS SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

Please indicate your reaction to the following statements by placing an X after the appropriate symbol. These symbols are to represent the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement. The symbols are:

SA = Strongly Agree

A = Agree

U = Undecided

D = Disagree

SD = Strongly Disagree

Please do not sign this survey or identify yourself in any way. There are neither control numbers on this survey nor any other way by which the author could identify persons taking this survey. Therefore, absolute anonymity is assured. With this guarantee, please respond to the statements as honestly as possible. No one will ever know how you responded.

It is realized that some of the statements are simplistic, while others are complex. Some of the statements are recognizable as sweeping generalizations. It is unlikely that any of the statements will express exactly the feelings of anyone answering this questionnaire. Thus, a strongly agree (SA) response would not necessarily mean that you agree 100 percent with all aspects of a statement.

PART I

1. There are no important qualitative differences between races.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

2. Measurable criteria such as IQ tests, which seem to indicate a qualitative difference between races, are attributable to environmental not genetic factors.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

3. Black Americans have such a history of deprivation that merely to grant them statutory equality is not enough. If they are ever going to catch up to the white majority they must be given more than just equal opportunity. Positive, affirmative action is necessary if blacks are ever to attain true equality.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

4. In giving blacks a "helping hand" it is not enough just to be more understanding. Concrete measures are required, such as quota systems, in order to assure equal black participation in our society.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

5. Blacks have now achieved basic equality before the law. That is to say, overt or de jure discrimination has ceased to be a problem.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

6. Nobody gave other ethnic groups a "helping hand." The other ethnic groups had hard times but they eventually made it on their own. If blacks would just work hard for a few generations they could make it too.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

7. It is unfair to expect Blacks to compete with whites using the same competitive standards. For instance, in the critical areas of schooling and jobs, most of the entry criteria are culturally biased in favor of the white middle class. Therefore, until the blacks achieve an equal cultural base the whites must institute quotas or other mechanisms to insure representative participation by blacks.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

8. Helping blacks attain equality is a fine idea. However, if it means that my own child might suffer reverse discrimination to make way for a less qualified black I would be opposed.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

9. The Army is practicing the quota system now. They may call it by another name, such as affirmative action, but it is really a quota system.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

10. The black officers in this CGSC class probably did not have to compete as fiercely to be selected for attendance as did the white officers.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

11. It is wrong for the Army to have quotas, official or otherwise. The Army should insure that no overt discrimination exists and that is as far as it should go. If the Army does more than that it is practicing reverse discrimination.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

12. Too much fuss is being made over this reverse discrimination thing. Sure, some of it is going on. It is necessary if we are to help blacks. Anyway, the number of whites that have actually suffered because of reverse discrimination is so small as to be insignificant.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

13. I am tired of hearing about race relations. Maybe all of this emphasis on the black problem was necessary a few years ago, but, we are over-doing it now.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

14. Blacks must be required at some level to prepare themselves to compete on an equal basis with whites. If a white officer comes from a deprived background he is expected to work to eliminate his deficiencies in areas such as oral and written communication. If he does not do so he will probably not get ahead. Blacks, however, are allowed to perpetuate their substandard dialect and point to it as a source of ethnic pride.

SA_____ A_____ U_____ D_____ SD_____

15. It is often a strain to be around black officers. You must be more careful of your manners, etc. If you happen not to like a certain black officer for reasons other than race, you must be careful not to let this show. Your dislike for this individual would likely be misconstrued as racial prejudice.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

16. Assuming that my qualifications and experience remained the same, I would have a better chance of making general officer if I suddenly became black.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

17. Generally, blacks have unfairly taken advantage of the race relations emphasis in the Army.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

18. Race is not an appropriate matter for consideration by promotion boards either for officers or enlisted.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

19. Army promotion boards should seek to promote the best qualified individuals without regard to race.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

20. The commander today is in a dilemma. If the commander treats blacks equally he can be criticized for not taking their socio-economic deprivation into account. If the commander takes the background of young black soldiers into account, and thus spends more of his time helping them, he can be chastised for not treating them the same as he would white soldiers.

SA _____ A _____ U _____ D _____ SD _____

PART II

1. What is your age?

a. 26-29	c. 36-40
b. 30-35	d. 40+

2. In which geographic area did you spend your formative years?
- | | |
|---------------|--|
| a. Northeast | f. Hawaii |
| b. Southeast | g. Alaska |
| c. Midwest | h. Other |
| d. Southwest | i. My family was so mobile during my youth that I really do not identify with any particular region. |
| e. West Coast | |
3. What is your source of commission?
- | | |
|--------------|--------------------------|
| a. U.S.M.A. | d. OCS |
| b. ROTC, DMG | e. National Guard |
| c. ROTC | f. Direct or Battlefield |
4. What is your highest civilian educational level? Assuming responses a-d represent ascending order.)
- | | |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|
| a. Bachelors | c. Professional (Law, Medicine, etc.) |
| b. Masters | d. Ph. D. |
5. To what racial group do you belong?
- | | |
|--------------|--------------------|
| a. Caucasian | d. American Indian |
| b. Negro | e. Latin American |
| c. Oriental | f. Other |
6. What is your rank?
- | |
|-----------------------|
| a. Captain |
| b. Major |
| c. Lieutenant Colonel |
7. Do you have prior enlisted service?
- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| a. No | c. More than two years, less than four |
| b. Two years or less | d. Four or more years |

APPENDIX B

JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREPARED 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
001	5532223322422444212	B988ABA	24	22	10
003	55224321121222122112	B088ABA	17	17	8
004	44224422242342443112	CCCAAGA	21	23	11
005	34223331352334344113	B8ABA8A	20	23	13
006	44443443223442534224	C8C8ABA	25	27	13
007	43144232242242443111	C1AAA8A	19	24	9
008	25124421241241222114	CEBAACA	19	18	9
009	4421222212223323212	BACAABA	19	15	9
010	55444242254442454222	BFAABA	24	32	12
012	55324441342542544322	BACAABA	25	27	14
013	44224423334442444322	B08AAAA	22	24	16
015	44442432331344244224	C1BAABA	22	25	14
016	45333331222233222221	BCA8AAA	17	19	11
017	5432344222333323222	BABAABA	19	22	13
018	55515513335155555115	B1A9AAC	30	24	19
019	55314211342242243112	CACBABA	21	20	10
020	444444444455544444214	B9FAABA	24	24	19
021	22211111511212314111	BABAABA	13	19	10
022	44214321131242232112	B0DAAB8	18	18	8
023	55422421241332445112	BADAAAD	24	22	10
024	45511221253444554111	CACBABA	23	26	12
025	44224221111121213111	B0CBABA	16	14	6
026	45542442243444444422	BE8BAAA	23	29	17
027	55555155115551515115	CADAAC8	30	32	9

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREP J 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
028	4433244443443434223	DADBACB	23	27	16
029	43114442221322413112	CBCBABA	18	18	10
031	3332432344452524112	BEABABA	22	23	14
032	55443442344452334223	9AABABA	25	28	15
033	55442442154242454111	BACBAAA	23	28	12
034	54422422242244554114	CAABACA	26	23	13
035	22434422323444444224	BACBABA	20	27	16
036	1341521113111113211111	89DAAAD	9	19	6
037	55415422342452343112	BEAAABD	23	26	12
038	24234311442213423112	CCCAACA	16	19	13
040	55432431334342244112	B0CAABA	22	23	14
041	55111512242443244211	BABAABA	21	18	14
042	23332322232322333112	C8DAAAD	15	21	10
043	55312312332333443113	BABABABA	23	19	12
045	55554554155555455113	D8FCACA	27	38	17
046	42222222232324444224	BCCBABA	20	20	12
047	53132423224342423322	B0CHAAA	21	18	15
048	44325532123442214121	B9ABAAA	19	22	12
049	22224311322342323214	88B8AAA	18	17	12
050	2432322234244443222	BADAABC	19	21	15
051	44524422442454154114	B0DAA8D	22	28	15
052	55225222451252454112	CADAABC	25	25	10
053	442222224322222423112	BCCAAB9	19	17	11
054	55114521535244434314	C1PAABA	26	17	22

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREP J 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
055	4212222231132232111	CCDAA8D	14	16	8
056	44222422452342255112	BAABABA	21	23	13
057	55555555555555555424	CIDBA8B	29	40	24
058	4414444242244444115	CBABABA	25	25	15
059	55244443233443433213	CBCBABA	24	27	14
060	55114421442333424213	BCCBAAA	24	18	15
061	55115411242333424213	BBB8AAA	24	18	13
062	5552422234142334111	BDCAABA	22	26	9
063	4432232243323223312	BA8AAAA	17	22	13
064	55553441551544554214	BD8BAAA	27	33	16
065	44211111121211132111	CCDAA8D	13	13	5
066	44324422342344444312	BACBABA	22	24	16
067	55542442234342224222	BBFBAB8	22	25	14
068	44222421332242243112	CBAABAB	19	18	12
069	52214515121311512111	DAFAACC	16	19	9
070	1311172122222222112	BA0AAAA	12	12	9
071	4432324223324433214	BBCBAB8	21	23	12
072	43122312352323345113	B1ABAAA	20	20	12
073	22114412152233232112	CE0AABC	13	19	11
074	55444443234242234422	BCABABA	22	27	15
075	55444442455444444425	BBB8ABA	27	29	21
076	44331322132344242112	BA9BABA	19	21	11
077	35245535233445544222	CCFCACA	23	30	17
078	14324232241324424115	BBDAAAD	20	23	10

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREP, 3 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
079	4422242124422424212	BACBABA	18	19	16
080	32222321342342224212	BIABAAA	17	18	12
081	24222221252242423213	CHABACA	20	18	10
082	23224322352242142112	RIAAAAA	14	23	11
083	22414422332233542112	89ABABA	16	22	13
085	22221221212411242111	CECBABA	10	17	8
086	23212222121122312112	CBDBABC	14	13	7
087	35422421142343544112	BCCAAAA	23	22	11
088	33222431153323333312	CACAAAB	16	21	14
089	3421443223222422422	DCDAAB8	17	20	14
090	443224243523233454223	BHCBABA	21	26	14
091	24434423444434454213	BBRAABA	20	29	14
092	11115421251234254112	CC9BACA	13	22	12
094	55474232442244243112	BICAAAA	21	26	13
095	55214441131141113112	BDCAA9A	20	17	8
097	5443232442334454223	8CAABAB	23	26	15
098	4442344234334444222	BHDBAAD	22	26	16
099	44115522343444454114	B8CAABA	24	24	16
100	54324432244244444224	CC8BABA	25	24	16
101	44224224342424443112	CCDAAB8	19	26	12
102	55322221241224223112	BIABABA	19	18	10
103	44442444244442244334	91CBABA	22	30	15
104	33445343242444433232	89RAABA	19	31	13
105	35222221234222222422	CBABAB8	16	16	14

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APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREP, J 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
106	55214211351151254111	C1C8A9A	22	20	8
107	342234323322243433222	B8B8ABC	20	20	14
108	44333222242323443111	B1DAAB8	18	23	11
109	222241212524222254111	B8DAAB8	13	25	8
110	43412431243432423112	8CABAAA	19	21	12
111	24114211111111113111	CCA8ABC	12	11	6
112	4422222244242244224	BCCBAAA	22	22	12
113	44222322444232234223	CCBAACA	20	19	15
114	244255111144444455115	CDCBABA	24	26	15
115	34542443344434434224	B1ABABA	22	29	17
116	2221122232322323112	RCBAABA	14	16	8
117	15554553255552334543	B0B8AAA	21	35	19
118	25452545224222224112	BAB8AAA	17	26	14
120	4432322222322222112	9DCAABA	16	19	9
121	55554552454454455112	BAABABA	26	35	18
122	45324442141242244211	BAABAAA	20	25	10
123	4322322233124244113	CAD8AB8	22	20	9
124	15545542254155455422	BADAAAB	22	31	20
126	55114121443341555113	CACBABA	27	21	10
127	35324342242234434412	CAAAABA	21	24	15
128	55411421444442544111	CAFAABD	24	21	15
129	55554342243323234441	C3FAACA	20	31	14
130	54222322452323444222	C1CBABA	21	22	14
131	44444442244444444332	CED8AB8	22	30	17

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

*** SURVEY RESULTS ***

DATE PREPARED 05/13/75

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
132	1411241114422555115	CADAA88	22	17	15
133	13444542344345354224	CACB888	19	30	19
134	43223322443233444114	CADAAA8	22	21	14
135	25224321234344223222	BCABABA	18	19	15
136	45222131452442241111	CADAAAD	17	23	10
137	33114113151141554115	CAPAABA	24	21	5
138	55215434422245534115	BCABAAA	28	22	16
139	444444422244442444224	8888ABA	24	28	14
140	5342424124132222111	CAB8ACA	15	24	8
141	234244322444242224112	8089ABC	17	23	13
142	24444444244442424432	88ABABA	20	30	16
143	42441212344211233112	BCABAAA	14	21	11
144	44422512444344243114	8E88ABA	21	22	18
146	2333222221222222422	CACB888	13	18	11
147	52324422253342243111	CCEAA8D	17	25	12
148	53335535353344555115	8CDAAB8	27	32	16
149	24221422441322452112	CABAACA	16	21	12
150	44554553344444323443	CCABABA	21	32	20
151	44444441135342514414	8CCBABA	25	24	16
152	47434422442342444214	DAB8ACA	22	26	14
153	55414241212443224411	CB88ABA	21	21	13
155	55512221431154555115	CCCAACC	30	20	12
156	44212211321232422412	CCDAABC	19	13	12
157	43224424442324444111	BACBABA	18	25	15

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

DATE PREP. 05/13/75

SURVEY RESULTS

ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFR	T1	T2
158	4422442244242242112	BIDAABC	18	24	13
159	434243422232342223112	BBDAAAB	18	24	10
161	43434222444443422224	BEABABA	21	25	15
162	55424422231241224214	CBDAAB8	24	21	10
163	442332234342443224	BCBAAAB	23	24	13
165	2311323224333423422	BERBA88	17	19	14
166	44212412341211243212	C1DAABD	16	18	11
167	34112212451242223112	BFABAB8	18	16	10
168	15412422132432431111	CADAACC	15	21	10
170	31115151351131533111	DECBABA	16	22	7
171	5422432244444455213	88EAAAA	25	25	17
172	44212212242334444112	88DAABC	21	19	11
173	4442444244422444442	88DAAAC	20	39	16
174	4444222222242444232	BACAABA	22	24	10
175	33223412232224444113	BEEAABA	19	19	13
176	43423422343422322323	CAFCACA	17	23	15
177	442233223244445114	BMCBABA	25	24	12
178	34433433343443334312	CCC8ABA	20	27	16
179	55344221141424432111	BAD9AB8	19	25	9
180	25475433443354255324	BCDAAB8	23	30	14
181	4444444224244444222	CACBABA	22	30	14
182	44444443244254444322	B1CBABA	23	29	17
183	23214221242341443113	B1ABAAA	19	21	8
184	24224131221323212311	BCCAARA	13	18	10

APPENDIX B

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JOHN L. CONDON, JR.

DATE PREP	05/13/75	*** SURVEY RESULTS ***			
ID-NO	ANSWERS	DEMOGRF	GFP	T1	T2
195	55424542353354444334	BACAABA	27	-28	18
186	45223422341342444112	B19BAAA	23	22	11
187	11442224232433334112	BAABAAA	14	26	10
188	23422442344444424222	BAABACD	19	24	17

APPENDIX C

AO 0013

C080L

V42P383B

05/13/75

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00001 ID DIVISION. SUR2.
00002 PROGRAM-ID. SUR2.
00003 AUTHOR. JOHN. J. WASSEBURGER.
00004 OATE-COMPILED. 05/13/75.
00005 REMARKS. THIS PROGRAM ADDS UP SELECTED ANSWERS AND COMBINES
00006 THEM IN THE NEW MATRIX.
00007 ENVIRONMENT DIVISION.
00008 CONFIGURATION SECTION.
00009 SOURCE-COMPUTER. 6500.
00010 OBJECT-COMPUTER. 6500.
00011 SPECIAL-NAMES.
00012 -- OUTPUT IS TTY.
00013 INPUT-OUTPUT SECTION.
00014 FILE-CONTROL.
00015 SELECT IN-FILE ASSIGN TO KK.
00016 SELECT OUT-FILE ASSIGN DISK1-FZ.
00017 DATA DIVISION.
00018 FILE SECTION.
00019 FD IN-FILE
00020 LABEL RECORD OMITTED.
00021 -01 IN-REC
00022 FD OUT-FILE
00023 LABEL RECORD OMITTED
00024 REPORT IS FILE-LIST.
00025 WORKING-STORAGE SECTION.
00026 77 PRT-CNT VALUE 0
00027 77 ROW-CNT VALUE 0
00028 77 MAT-CNT VALUE 0
00029 77 ROW-HOLD VALUE 0
00030 77 TITLE-TOP VALUE SPACE
00031 77 IO-CNT VALUE 0
00032 77 DEM1 VALUE SPACE
00033 77 DEM2 VALUE SPACE
00034 77 DEM3 VALUE SPACE
00035 01 MAT-LIM
00036 01 TITLES.
00037 03 TITLE OCCURS 7 TIMES
00038 01 WS-REC.
00039 03 ROW OCCURS 200 TIMES.
00040 05 ID-NO
00041 05 FILLER
00042 05 ANS-ALL.
00043 07 ANS OCCURS 20 TIMES
00044 05 FILLER
00045 05 ID-DATA-ALL.
00046 07 ID-DATA OCCURS 7 TIMES
00047 05 RECAP OCCURS 3 TIMES
00048 01 WS-MAT1.
00049 03 MAT1-ROW OCCURS 6 TIMES.
00050 05 MAT1 OCCURS 3 TIMES
00051 01 WS-MAT2.
00052 03 MAT2-ROW OCCURS 6 TIMES.
00053 05 MAT2 OCCURS 3 TIMES
00054 01 WS-MAT3.
00055 03 MAT3-ROW OCCURS 6 TIMES.
00056 05 MAT3 OCCURS 3 TIMES

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PAGE

11.37.11.

05/12/75

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C080L

A0 0013

00057
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REPORT SECTION.
RD FILE-LIST
PAGE LIMIT IS 60 LINES
HEADING 01
LAST DETAIL 55
FOOTING 58.
01 TYPE IS PAGE HEADING.
03 LINE 01.
05 COLUMN 004 VALUE "DATE PREPARED"
05 COLUMN 19 SOURCE "TODAYS-DATE"
05 COLUMN 45 VALUE "SURVEY RESULTS ***"
05 COLUMN 101 VALUE "JOHN L. CONDON, JR."
03 LINE PLUS 03.
05 COLUMN 20 VALUE "ID-NO"
05 COLUMN 32 VALUE "ANSWERS"
05 COLUMN 50 VALUE "DEMOGRAPH"
05 COLUMN 65 VALUE "GFR"
05 COLUMN 76 VALUE "T1"
05 COLUMN 87 VALUE "T2"
03 LINE PLUS 02.
05 COLUMN 05 VALUE SPACE
01 DATA-LINE TYPE IS DETAIL.
03 LINE PLUS 02.
05 COLUMN 21 SOURCE "ID-NO (ROW-CNT)"
05 COLUMN 25 SOURCE "ANS-ALL (ROW-CNT)"
05 COLUMN 50 SOURCE "ID-DATA-ALL (ROW-CNT)"
05 COLUMN 65 SOURCE "RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1)"
05 COLUMN 76 SOURCE "RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2)"
05 COLUMN 87 SOURCE "RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3)"
01 TYPE IS PAGE FOOTING.
03 LINE SR.
05 COLUMN 115 VALUE "PAGE"
05 COLUMN 120 SOURCE PAGE-COUNTER

PIC X(13).
PIC X(10).
PIC X(22).
PIC X(19).
PIC X(5).
PIC X(7).
PIC X(7).
PIC XXX.
PIC XXX.
PIC XXX.
PIC XXX.
PIC 999.
PIC X(20).
PIC X(7).
PIC ZZ9.
PIC ZZ9.
PIC ZZ9.
PIC XXX.
PIC ZZ9.

ERROR

AO 0013	C08DL	V42P3838	05/13/75	11:37.11.	PAGE	3
000090	PROCEDURE DIVISION.					
000091	0010-OPEN.					
000092	OPEN INPUT IN-FILE					
000093	OUTPUT OUT-FILE.					
000094	0020-READ.					
000095	ADD 1 TO ROW-CNT.					
000096	READ IN-FILE INTO ROW (ROW-CNT)					
000097	END GO TO 0060-BUILD.					
000098	MOVE 0 TO RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1). RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2)					
000099	RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3).					
000100	COMPUTE RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1) = ANS (ROW-CNT, 1)					
000101	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 2) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 13)					
000102	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 15) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 17)					
000103	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 20).					
000104	COMPUTE RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) = ANS (ROW-CNT, 3)					
000105	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 4) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 5)					
000106	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 7) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 8)					
000107	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 10) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 12)					
000108	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 16).					
000109	COMPUTE RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3) = ANS (ROW-CNT, 6)					
000110	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 9) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 11)					
000111	* ANS (ROW-CNT, 14) * ANS (ROW-CNT, 18).					
000112	GO TO 0020-READ.					
000113	0030-INIT.					
000114	PERFORM 0040-MOVE-0 VARYING MAT-CNT FROM 1 BY 1					
000115	UNTIL MAT-CNT > MAT-LIM.					
000116	0040-MOVE-0.					
000117	MOVE 0 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 1), MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 2),					
000118	MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 3), MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 1)					
000119	MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 2), MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 3).					
000120	MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 1), MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 2), MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 3).					
000121	0050-TALLY.					
000122	IF ID-DATA (ROW-CNT, 10-CNT) = DEM1 OR DEM2 OR DEM3					
000123	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1) > 5 AND < 15					
000124	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 1)					
000125	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1) > 14 AND < 23					
000126	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 2)					
000127	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1) > 22 AND < 31					
000128	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT, 3)					
000129	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 1) < 0 OR > 30					
000130	DISPLAY "ERROR SUM GFR. ROW CNT= " ROW-CNT UPON TTY.					
000131	IF ID-DATA (ROW-CNT, 10-CNT) = DEM1 OR DEM2 OR DEM3					
000132	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 7 AND < 20					
000133	ADD 1 TO MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 1)					
000134	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 19 AND < 31					
000135	ADD 1 TO MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 2)					
000136	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 30 AND < 41					
000137	ADD 1 TO MAT2 (MAT-CNT, 3)					
000138	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) < 0 OR > 40					
000139	DISPLAY "ERROR SUM T1. ROW CNT= " ROW-CNT UPON TTY.					
000140	IF ID-DATA (ROW-CNT, 10-CNT) = DEM1 OR DEM2 OR DEM3					
000141	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3) > 4 AND < 12					
000142	ADD 1 TO MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 1)					
000143	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3) > 11 AND < 19					
000144	ADD 1 TO MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 2)					
000145	ELSE IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 3) > 18 AND < 26					

AD 0013	0080L	V42P3838	05/13/75	11-37-11.	PAGE
00146					0056 0028
00147					0047 0027
00148					0027 0012
00149					
00150					0029 0027
00151					0035
00152					
00153					0030
00154					0037
00155					0037
00156					0031
00157					0032
00158					0033
00159					0034
00160					0027 0029
00161					0032
00162					0033
00163					0027 0029
00164					0027
00165					0027 0029
00166					
00167					0035
00168					0030
00169					0037
00170					0037
00171					0037
00172					0037
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00177					0037
00178					0037
00179					0037
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00181					0037
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00184					0037
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00195					0037
00196					0037
00197					0037
00198					0037
00199					0037
00200					0037
00201					0037

AOD 1 TO MAT3 (MAT-CNT, 3)
 ELSE IF PECAP (ROW-CNT, 3) < 5 OR > 25
 DISPLAY "ERROR SUM 12. ROW CNT= " ROW-CNT /POM ITT.
 0060-BUILD1. ROW-HOLD = ROW-CNT - 1.
 COMPUTE ROW-HOLD = ROW-CNT - 1.
 MOVE 2 TO MAT-LIM.
 PERFORM 0030-INIT.
 MOVE "AGE" TO TITLE-TOPI.
 MOVE "<36" TO TITLE (1).
 MOVE ">35" TO TITLE (2).
 MOVE 1 TO ID-CNT.
 MOVE "A" TO DEMI.
 MOVE "R" TO DEM2.
 MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.
 MOVE SPACE TO DEM3.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "C" TO DEMI.
 MOVE "D" TO DEM2.
 MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 PERFORM 0185-PRINT.
 0070-RUILO2.
 MOVE 6 TO MAT-LIM.
 PERFORM 0030-INIT.
 MOVE "GEO LOC" TO TITLE-TOPI.
 MOVE "NE" TO TITLE (1).
 MOVE "SE" TO TITLE (2).
 MOVE "NW" TO TITLE (3).
 MOVE "SW" TO TITLE (4).
 MOVE "WC" TO TITLE (5).
 MOVE "OB" TO TITLE (6).
 MOVE SPACE TO DEM2. DEM3.
 MOVE 2 TO ID-CNT.
 MOVE "A" TO DEMI.
 MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "B" TO DEMI.
 MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "C" TO DEMI.
 MOVE 3 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "D" TO DEMI.
 MOVE 4 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "E" TO DEMI.
 MOVE 5 TO MAT-CNT.
 PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1
 UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.
 MOVE "I" TO DEMI.

AO 0013	2090L	V42P3838	05/13/75	11.37.11.	PAGE	5
00202	MOVE 5 TO MAT-CNT.		000202		0028	
00203	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000203		0027	0029
00204	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000204			
00205	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000205			
00206	0090-BUILD3.		000206		0035	
00207	MOVE 3 TO MAT-LIM.		000207			
00208	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000208		0030	
00209	MOVE "COMM SOURCE" TO TITLE-TOP.		000209		0037	
00210	MOVE "USMA" TO TITLE (1).		000210		0037	
00211	MOVE "HOTC" TO TITLE (2).		000211		0033	
00212	MOVE "OTM" TO TITLE (3).		000212		0032	
00213	MOVE SPACE TO DEM2.		000213		0031	
00214	MOVE "A" TO DEM1.		000214		0028	
00215	MOVE 3 TO ID-CNT.		000215		0027	0029
00216	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.		000216		0027	
00217	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000217		0027	0029
00218	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000218		0032	
00219	MOVE "B" TO DEM1.		000219		0033	
00220	MOVE "C" TO DEM2.		000220		0028	
00221	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.		000221		0027	0029
00222	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000222		0027	
00223	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000223		0032	
00224	MOVE "D" TO DEM1.		000224		0034	
00225	MOVE "E" TO DEM2.		000225		0028	
00226	MOVE "F" TO DEM3.		000226		0027	0029
00227	MOVE 3 TO MAT-CNT.		000227		0032	
00228	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000228		0027	0029
00229	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000229		0034	
00230	PERFORM 0145-PRINT.		000230		0028	
00231	0090-BUILD4.		000231		0027	0029
00232	MOVE 2 TO MAT-LIM.		000232		0035	
00233	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000233		0032	0034
00234	MOVE SPACES TO DEM1, DEM2, DEM3.		000234		0030	
00235	MOVE "CIV ED" TO TITLE-TOP.		000235		0027	
00236	MOVE "RACH" TO TITLE (1).		000236		0027	
00237	MOVE "WAST" TO TITLE (2).		000237		0032	
00238	MOVE "A" TO DEM1.		000238		0031	
00239	MOVE 4 TO ID-CNT.		000239		0024	
00240	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.		000240		0027	0029
00241	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000241		0032	
00242	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000242		0027	0029
00243	MOVE "B" TO DEM1.		000243		0034	
00244	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.		000244		0027	
00245	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000245		0027	0029
00246	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000246		0035	
00247	PERFORM 0145-PRINT.		000247		0032	
00248	0100-BUILD5.		000248		0030	
00249	MOVE 2 TO MAT-LIM.		000249		0027	
00250	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000250		0027	0029
00251	MOVE "A" TO DEM1.		000251		0037	
00252	MOVE "WANK" TO TITLE-TOP.		000252		0031	
00253	MOVE "CPT" TO TITLE (1).		000253		0022	
00254	MOVE "FG" TO TITLE (2).		000254		0027	0029
00255	MOVE 6 TO ID-CNT.		000255		0035	
00256	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.		000256		0032	
00257	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000257		0027	

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00258	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000258		0027 0029
00259	MOVE "9" TO DEM1.		000259		0032
00260	MOVE "C" TO DEM2.		000260		0033
00261	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.		000261		0028
00262	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000262		0027 0029
00263	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000263		
00264	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000264		
00265	0110-BUILD7.		000265		
00266	MOVE 2 TO MAT-LIV.		000266		0035
00267	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000267		
00268	MOVE SPACE TO DEM2, DEM3.		000268		0033 0034
00269	MOVE "ENL SVC" TO TITLE-TOP.		000269		0030
00270	MOVE "NO" TO TITLE (1).		000270		0017
00271	MOVE "YES" TO TITLE (2).		000271		0037
00272	MOVE 7 TO IO-CNT.		000272		0031
00273	MOVE "A" TO DEM1.		000273		0022
00274	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.		000274		0028
00275	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000275		0027 0029
00276	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000276		
00277	MOVE "B" TO DEM1.		000277		0072
00278	MOVE "C" TO DEM2.		000278		0033
00279	MOVE "D" TO DEM3.		000279		0014
00280	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.		000280		0028
00281	PERFORM 0050-TALLY VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000281		0027 0029
00282	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000282		
00283	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000283		
00284	0130-GEN-KECAP-MATRIX.		000284		
00285	MOVE 3 TO MAT-LIV.		000285		0035
00286	MOVE "H" TO TITLE (1).		000286		0037
00287	MOVE "I" TO TITLE (2).		000287		0037
00288	MOVE "L" TO TITLE (3).		000288		0037
00289	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000289		
00290	PERFORM 0140-TI-GFR-MATRIX VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000290		0027 0029
00291	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000291		0027 0029
00292	MOVE "GFR" TO TITLE-TOP.		000292		0030
00293	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000293		
00294	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000294		
00295	PERFORM 0140-TI-GFR-MATRIX VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000295		0027 0029
00296	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000296		0037
00297	MOVE "T2" TO TITLE (2).		000297		
00298	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000298		
00299	PERFORM 0030-INIT.		000299		0027 0029
00300	PERFORM 0170-T2-TI-MATRIX VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1		000300		0030
00301	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.		000301		
00302	MOVE "T1" TO TITLE-TOP.		000302		0027 0029
00303	PERFORM 0185-PRINT.		000303		0030
00304	GO TO 9000-CLOSE.		000304		
00305	0140-TI-GFR-MATRIX.		000305		
00306	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.		000306		0020
00307	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 7 AND < 20		000307		0047 0027
00308	PERFORM 0150-RODY1.		000308		
00309	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.		000309		0028
00310	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 19 AND < 31		000310		0047 0027
00311	PERFORM 0150-RODY1.		000311		
00312	MOVE 3 TO MAT-CNT.		000312		0025
00313	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT, 2) > 30 AND < 41		000313		0047 0027
00314			000314		

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00314	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000315			
00315	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 1) > 5 AND < 15			000316		0047 0027	
00316	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 1).			000317		0050 0024	
00317	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 1) > 14 AND < 23			000318		0047 0027	
00318	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 2).			000319		0050 0024	
00319	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 1) > 22 AND < 31			000320		0047 0027	
00320	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 3).			000321		0050 0028	
00321	PERFORM 0150-MATRIX.			000322			
00322	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.			000323		0028	
00323	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 4 AND < 12			000324		0047 0027	
00324	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000325			
00325	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.			000326		0028	
00326	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 11 AND < 19			000327		0047 0027	
00327	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000328			
00328	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 18 AND < 26			000329		0047 0027	
00329	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000330			
00330	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000331		0047 0027	
00331	PERFORM 0150-BOOY1.			000332			
00332	MOVE 1 TO MAT-CNT.			000333		0028	
00333	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 4 AND < 12			000334		0047 0027	
00334	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000335			
00335	MOVE 2 TO MAT-CNT.			000336		0028	
00336	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 11 AND < 19			000337		0047 0027	
00337	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000338			
00338	MOVE 3 TO MAT-CNT.			000339		0028	
00339	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 3) > 18 AND < 26			000340		0047 0027	
00340	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000341			
00341	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000342		0047 0027	
00342	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 2) > 7 AND < 20			000343		0050 0024	
00343	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 1).			000344		0047 0027	
00344	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 2) > 19 AND < 31			000345		0050 0024	
00345	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 2).			000346		0047 0027	
00346	IF RECAP (ROW-CNT. 2) > 30 AND < 41			000347		0050 0024	
00347	ADD 1 TO MAT1 (MAT-CNT. 3).			000348			
00348	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000349		0012	
00349	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000350		0012	
00350	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000351		0012	
00351	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000352		0012	
00352	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000353		0012	
00353	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000354		0012	
00354	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000355		0012	
00355	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000356		0012	
00356	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000357		0012	
00357	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000358		0012	
00358	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000359		0012	
00359	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000360		0012	
00360	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000361		0012	
00361	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000362		0012	
00362	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000363		0012	
00363	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000364		0012	
00364	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000365		0012	
00365	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000366		0012	
00366	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000367		0012	
00367	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000368		0012	
00368	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000369		0012	
00369	PERFORM 0180-BOOY2.			000370		0012	

LINE	CODE	DATE	PAGE
00370	AO 0013	05/13/75	11.37.11.
00371	DISP	00371	0037
00372	MAT2 (PRT-CNT. 2).	00372	0053
00373	DISP	00373	0026
00374	DISP	00374	0053
00375	DISP	00375	0026
00376	MAT3 (PRT-CNT. 3)	00376	0056
00377	DISP	00377	0022
00378	GENERATE DATA-LINE.	00378	0078
00379	INITIATE FILE-LIST.	00379	0054
00380	PERFORM 8900-PRINT VARYING ROW-CNT FROM 1 BY 1	00380	0027
00381	UNTIL ROW-CNT > ROW-HOLD.	00381	0029
00382	TERMINATE FILE-LIST.	00382	0054
00383	CLOSE IN-FILE, OUT-FILE.	00383	0019
00384	STOP RUN.	00384	0022
00385		00385	

0210-PRINTC.
 8900-PRINT-PRINT.
 9000-CLOSE.
 SUR2 LENGTH IS 007106
 057400H SCH USED

5.

0391/00

PAGE

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0090L

AO 0013

LINE NO.....DIAGNOSTIC NOS.

0077	0012
0086	0716
0089	0409
0095	0809
0114	0800
0150	0807
0161	0809
0165	0409
0183	0409
0187	0809
0191	0809
0195	0409
0199	0409
0203	0409
0217	0409
0222	0409
0224	0809
0231	0409
0245	0309
0251	0409
0262	0809
0275	0409
0281	0809
0290	0309
0295	0809
0300	0409
0355	0809
0359	0809
0363	0409
0381	0809

NAME	6000 COBOL PROCEDURE NAME	CROSS REFERENCE LIST REFERENCES	PAGE
0010-OPEN	00091 NONE		11
0020-READ	00094 00112		
0030-INIT	00113 00152	00267 00289 00294 00299	
0040-MOVE-0	00116 00114		
0050-TALLY	00121 00161	00195 00199 00203 00217 00222 00228 00241	
	00245 00245		
0060-BUILD1	00149 00097		
0070-BUILD2	00169 NONE		
0080-BUILD3	00206 NONE		
0090-BUILD4	00231 NONE		
0100-BUILD6	00248 NONE		
0110-BUILD7	00265 NONE		
0130-GEN-RECAP-MATRIX	00244 NONE		
0140-T1-GR-MATRIX	00305 00290		
0150-BCOY1	00315 00309	00330	
0160-T1-GR-MATRIX	00322 00295		
0170-T2-T1-MATRIX	00331 00300		
0180-BCOY2	00341 00334		
0185-PRINT	00348 00168		
0190-PRINTA	00365 00355		
0200-PRINTB	00369 00359		
0210-PRINTC	00373 00363		
0220-PRINT	00377 00381		
9000-CLOSE	00379 00304		

NAME	DEFINITION	5000 COBOL DATA NAME CROSS REFERENCE LIST	REFERENCES	PAGE
ANS	00043 00100	00101 00101	00102 00102 00103 00104 00105 00105 00106 00107	12
ANS-ALL	00042 00081	00108 00109	00110 00110 00111 00111	
DATA-LINE	00078 00378			
DEM1	00032 00122	00131 00140	00157 00163 00181 00185 00189 00193 00197 00201 00214	
DEM2	00033 00122	00224 00234 00238 00243 00251 00259 00273 00277 00281 00284	00158 00164 00179 00213 00220 00225 00234 00240 00242	
DEM3	00034 00123	00132 00141	00160 00179 00226 00234 00268 00279	
FILE-LIST	00058 00380	00393		
ID-CNT	00031 00122	00131 00140	00156 00180 00215 00239 00255 00272	
ID-DATA	00045 00122	00131 00140		
ID-DATA-ALL	00045 00382			
ID-NO	00040 00080			
IN-FILE	00019 00092	00096 00384		
IN-REC	00021 NONE			
LINE-COUNTER	00000 NONE			
MAT1	00050 00117	00117 00118	00124 00126 00128 00317 00319 00321 00343 00345 00347	
MAT1-ROW	00049 NONE	00366 00367		
MAT2	00053 00114	00119 00119	00135 00137 00370 00371 00371	
MAT2-ROW	00052 NONE			
MAT3	00056 00120	00120 00120	00142 00144 00146 00374 00375 00375	
MAT3-ROW	00055 NONE			
MAT-CNT	00028 00114	00115 00117	00118 00118 00119 00119 00120 00120 00120 00124	
	00126 00126	00135 00137	00142 00144 00146 00159 00159 00162 00164	
	00190 00194	00222 00216	00221 00227 00240 00244 00256 00261 00274	
	00280 00306	00312 00317	00319 00321 00323 00326 00332 00335 00334	
	00343 00345	00347		
MAT-LIM	00035 00115	00151 00170	00207 00232 00249 00266 00285 00356 00360 00364	
OUT-FILE	00022 00093	00384		
PAGE-COUNTER	00020 00089	00355 00359	00360 00363 00364 00366 00367 00367 00370 00370	
PRT-CNT	00026 00371	00374 00374	00375 00375 00375	
RECAP	00047 00083	00384 00085	00388 00388 00389 00100 00104 00109 00123 00123 00127	
	00129 00316	00132 00134	00136 00138 00141 00143 00145 00147 00307 00310 00313 00344	
ROW	00039 00095	00318 00320	00324 00327 00329 00333 00336 00339 00342 00344 00344	
ROW-CNT	00027 00104	00098 00098	00099 00109 00109 00109 00109 00109 00109 00109 00109 00109	
	00110 00111	00105 00105	00106 00106 00106 00106 00106 00106 00106 00106 00106 00106	
	00136 00136	00139 00139	00140 00140 00140 00140 00140 00140 00140 00140 00140 00140	
	00165 00167	00183 00183	00184 00184 00184 00184 00184 00184 00184 00184 00184 00184	
	00203 00204	00217 00217	00218 00218 00218 00218 00218 00218 00218 00218 00218 00218	
	00257 00258	00262 00262	00263 00263 00263 00263 00263 00263 00263 00263 00263 00263	
	00300 00301	00307 00307	00310 00310 00310 00310 00310 00310 00310 00310 00310 00310	
	00336 00336	00342 00342	00344 00344 00344 00344 00344 00344 00344 00344 00344 00344	
ROW-HOLD	00029 00150	00162 00162	00164 00164 00164 00164 00164 00164 00164 00164 00164 00164	
TITLE	00037 00154	00246 00246	00253 00253 00253 00253 00253 00253 00253 00253 00253 00253	
TITLES	00037 00237	00155 00173	00174 00174 00174 00174 00174 00174 00174 00174 00174 00174	
	00036 NONE	00253 00254	00270 00271 00286 00287 00288 00297 00344 00370 00374	

APPENDIX C

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AO 0013

6000 COBOL DATA NAME CROSS REFERENCE LIST REFERENCES

DEFINITION

00030	00153	00172	00209	00235	00252	00269	00292	00302	00351
00000	00066								
00048	NONE								
00051	NONE								
00054	NONE								
00039	NONE								

NAME

TITLE-TOP
TODAYS-DATE
WS-MAT1
WS-MAT2
WS-MAT3
WS-REC